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Benefit-Cost Analysis of
Government Regulation
by Murray L. Weidenbaum

D

ISCUSSIONS OF GOVERNMENT regulation of product
hazards, such as toxic substances, frequently conclude
that decision makers would be aided by the results of benefit-cost studies and related economic analyses. 1 This article tries
to explain the role of such quantitative analyses in the regulatory
process.
The motive for incorporating benefit-cost analysis into public decision making is to lead to a more efficient allocation of government
resources by subjecting the public sector to the same type of quantitative constraints as those in the private sector. In making an
investment decision, for example, business executives compare the
costs to be incurred with the expected revenues. If the costs exceed the revenues, the investment usually is not consideFed worthwhile. If revenues exceed costs, further consideration usually is
given the proposal, although capital constraints require another
determination of the most financially attractive investments.
The government agency decision maker, however, does not face
the same type of economic constraints. If the costs and other disAt the time of this printing, Dr. Weidenbaum was nominated Chairman of the U.S. Council of
Economic Advisers. He was Director of the Center for the Study of American Business at
Washington University in St. Louis when this article was written. Reprinted with permission from
TOXIC SUBSTANCES JOURNAL, Volume 2, Number 2, Autumn 1980, pp. 91-102.

advantages to society of an agency action exceed the benefits and
other advantages, that situation may not have an in1mediate adverse impact on the agency. However, such an action would have
an hnmediate impact on a private business if one of its executives
1nade an error. Such analytical information rarely exists in the
public sector, so that, more often than not, the govenunental decision n1aker is not aware that he or she is approving a regulation
that is economically inefficient. The ain1 of requiring agencies to
perfonn benefit-cost analysis is to make the governn1ent' s decisionn1aking process more effective, and to elhninate regulatory actions
that, on balance, generate n1ore costs than benefits. This result
is not assured by benefit-cost analysis, since political and other
in1portant, but subjective, considerations may dominate. This n1ay
result in actions that are not economically efficient, but are desired on grounds of equity or income distribution. Yet benefitcost analysis may provide valuable information for governn1ent
decision makers.

The Economic Rationale
It may be useful to consider the economic rationale for making
benefit-cost analyses of government actions. Economists have long
been interested in identifying policies that promote economic welfare, specifically by in1proving the efficiency with which a society
uses its resources. 2
Benefits are measured in terms of the increased production of
goods and services. Costs are computed in terms of the foregone
benefits that would have been obtained by using those resources
in some other activity. The underlying aim of benefit-cost analysis
is to maximize the value of the social income, usually measured
by the gross national product (GNP). For many years, certain federal agencies (such as the Corps of Engineers and the Bureau of
Reclamation) have used benefit-cost analysis to evaluate prospective projects.
Despite important operational difficulties, including that of choosing an appropriate discount rate, which would correspond to a
realistic estimate of the social cost of capital, these analyses have
helped to in1prove the allocation of government resources. They
have served as a partial screening device to eliminate uneconomical
projects-those for which prospective gains are clearly less than
2

estimated costs. The analyses also have provided some basis for
ranking and comparing projects and choosing among alternatives.
Perhaps the overriding value of benefit-cost analysis has been to
demonstrate the in1portance of making relatively objective economic evaluations of political actions and to narrow the area in
which subjective factors dominate. Thus, if economically inefficient programs are approved, at least government decision makers
know the price being paid for those actions. 3

Applying Analysis to Regulation
Figure 1 shows the basic relationship of costs and benefits that
tends to hold for n1ost regulatory programs. Typically, the initial
regulatory effort-such as cleaning up the worst effects of pollution in a river-may well generate benefits greater than costs. But
the resources required to achieve additional cleanup become disproportionately high, and at some point the added benefits may
be substantially less than the added costs. For example, a study
of the impact of environmental controls on the fruit and vegetable processing industry revealed that it costs less to eliminate
the first 85 percent of the pollution than the next 10 percent. 4 In
beet sugar plants, it costs more than $1 a pound to reduce bioFigure 1
Benefit-Cost Analysis of Regulation
Cost

Economic
Impact

0
Extent of Regulation
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logical oxygen demand (BOD) -a n1easure of the oxygen required
to deeompose organic wastes-up to a level where 30 percent of
pollution is eliminated. But it costs an additional $20 for a onepound reduction at the 65 percent control level and an additional
$60 for a one-pound reduction when over 95 percent control is
achieved. 5
Another comparison is equally telling. The pulp and paper industry spent $3 billion between 1970 and 1978 complying with
federal clean-water standards, and achieved a 95 percent reduction in pollution. But to reach the new reduction goal proposed
by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)-98 percent by 1984
-would cost $4.8 billion more, a 160 percent increase in costs to
achieve a 3 percent improvement in water quality. Thus, it is
important to look beyond the relationship of the costs and the
benefits of a proposed governmental undertaking to the additional (marginal) benefits and costs resulting from each extension
of or addition to the governmental activities.
If regulatory activity goes unchecked, the result could be an
excess of costs over benefits. Thus, benefit-cost analyses should
be viewed as a tool for identifying the optimum amount of regulation, rather than as a means of debating the pros and cons of
regulation in general. To an economist, "overregulation" is not
an emotional term; it is merely shorthand for the regulatory ac.
tivities in which th~ costs to the public are greater than the benefits.
When there is more than one alternative for attaining a regulatory goal, benefit-cost analysis can be used to compare the various methods and to help select the most attractive. Consider the
following hypothetical example: Suppose a government agency
wishes to control the amount of pollutants a factory is spilling
into a river. Assume technology allows for two means of reducing
the pollution, System A and System B, of which System B is costlier,
but more effective (see Table 1).
Table 1
Applying Benefit-Cost Analysis
System

Total Annual Cost

Total Annual Benefits

A

$14,000
26,000

$17,500
34,000

8

4

Benefit-Cost Ratio

1.25
1.38

Systen1 B has greater benefits per dollar spent than Syste1n A
(i.e., a benefit-cost ratio of 1.38 compared with 1.25). Although
System B has a larger annual cost than System A, System B will
yield the greater benefit to society. In the creation of government
policy, however, such simple cases are rarely encountered.
If a business decision in the private sector places an external
burden on its neighbors, such as pollution, the firm does not include such a cost in its accounting, since it does not bear the
burden. Public sector decision makers, however, must, or at least
ought to, consider all the effects of such a decision. Because their
vantage point is the entire nation, government regulators-unlike
their private sector counterparts-should attempt to include all
costs and benefits, including those external to the government.
The agencies should do so because most regulatory actions have
indirect effects on the economy. For example, requiring safety belts
in autmnobiles has a direct in1pact on the cost of automobiles and
on sales in the safety belt industry. It also influences the severity
of auto accidents and has a ripple effect on the suppliers of the
safety belt industry and their suppliers, and so on. If a regulatory
decision is to be good, these indirect effects, as well as the direct
impacts, must be taken into account.

Quantification
The benefits and costs attributable to regulation are measured
by the difference between the benefits and costs that occur in the
presence of regulation and those that would prevail in its absence.
Although the idea may seem straightforward, its application can
be complex. Determining what would occur in the absence of regulation-which establishes a reference point for the calculationsmay involve a considerable amount of judgment.
Table 2 shows how the incremental costs (the expenses that
would not have been made in the absence of regulation) were
computed in one study of water pollution control. Apparently the
bulk of the costs would have been undertaken voluntarily.
Sometimes the indirect effects of regulation may be as important
as the direct. Consider, for example, the question of mandatory
standards to ensure the production of less hazardous consumer
products. From time to time, suggestions have been made to require more protection in helmets and other recreational equipment
5

Table 2
Calculation of Incremental Cost of Regulation
Steps

Example

Company identifies an action taken to
comply with a specific regulation.

Installation of waste-water pretreatment system to remove 99 percent of
pollutants in compliance with Title
40 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Chapter 1, Part 128.

Would action have ,been taken otherwise?

Pretreatment system without Title 40
would have been designed to remove
95 percent of pollutants.

What was the cost of the action?

$1,200,000 (from fixed-asset ledger
data).

How much would the action that
would have been taken in the absence
of regulation have cost?

$800,000 (the cost of installing a 95
percent system) .

What was the incremental cost?

$1,200,000 - $800,000

= $400,000.

Source: Regulation, July/August, 1979, p. 21.

used in playing football. Those using the safer helmets would be
expected to receive the benefit of fewer or less severe injuries.
However, such a safety standard could impose substantial costs
on lower-income youngsters. Perhaps of greater concern, the standards might even contribute to more injuries since the price increases might result in more people playing football without any
protective equipment at all. That example illustrates another basic
thrust of benefit-cost analysis-to examine the proposed government
action not only from the viewpoint of the impact on the business
firm but also from the vantage point of the effects on the consumer.
A large, but difficult to measure, type of regulatory cost is a
grouping that economists refer to as dead-weight losses. Regulation
often limits the range of permissible prices, practices, or processes.
Those legal restrictions may inhibit the most productive use of
resources. The loss of the higher output that would result in the
absence of the regulatory activity-those dead-weight losses-arises
from an inefficient combination of factors. For example, the total
efficiency of the economy is reduced when regulated surface transportation rates make it necessary for freight to be moved by rail
rather than hauled at a lower cost by truck. 0 That is so because
6

more resources are being used to achieve the same objective.
When political judgment suggests that it is not feasible to put
a dollar sign on the benefits, a benefit-cost analysis still can be
helpful by ranking the cost-effectiveness of alternatives. By using
this method, which was originally developed for military programs,
estimates are made of the costs of different ways to accomplish an
objective. Cost-effectiveness analyses permit policymakers to identify least-cost solutions. In this more limited approach, the analyst
assumes that the objective is worth accomplishing. In the regulatory field, this approach may be particularly useful in dealing
with programs to reduce personal hazards. Instead of dealing with
such an imponderable question as the cost of a hun1an life, the
emphasis shifts to identifying regulatory approaches that would
maximize the number of lives saved after use of certain resources
(such as people or capital), or minimize pain. Rather than a cold
systems approach, such attempts at objective analysis show true
compassion for our fellow human beings by making the most effective use of the limited resources available to society. 7

Discounting
A regulatory action has an impact not only in the present but
also in the future. It is necessary, therefore, to place a lower value
on future costs and benefits than on present costs and benefits. The
basic notion here is that a given benefit is worth more today than
tomorrow, and a given cost is less burdensome if borne tomorrow
than today. (This is a restaten1ent of the economic principle that
a dollar received today is worth more than a dollar received tomorrow, because today's dollar could be invested and earn a return.) For this reason, future benefits and costs have less weight
than today's benefits and costs.
This practice is important in evaluating regulatory actions. If
the costs and benefits of two actions appear equal, and most of the
benefits of one action occur after five years, while the benefits
of the other action occur imn1ediately, then the latter is the preferred alternative. Discounting of the future thus implies that the
timing of any proposed action's costs and benefits is an important
consideration in its evaluation.
Assuming we are able to quantify the costs and benefits in a
given program, it is then necessary to discount correctly the ben7

efits and costs expected in the future. The discount rate ( r) can
be crucial, as is seen in the highly simplified, two-period example
shown in Table 3.
Table 3
The Role of Interest Rates

Plan

A
B

Benefit
Period 1

$200
0

Benefit
Period 2

Cost
Period 1

0
$215

$100
$100

Discounted Benefit in Period I
r= 10%

$200
$195

r=5%

$200
$205

If all costs accrue in period 1 and the discount rate is 10 percent, then plan A is superior to plan B. However, if the correct
discount rate is 5 percent, not 10 percent, then plan B is preferable. The appropriate discount rate is obviously very important in
benefit-cost analysis. Such decisions can be biased, however, if
Congress or a government agency designates an unrealistically
low interest rate, which frequently has been the case in federal
expenditure programs. Such an action tends to underestimate the
costs of initial capital outlays and overestimate the extent of future
benefits.

Uses and Limitations of Benefit-Cost Analysis
Reliable measures of costs and benefits are not easily achieved
or always possible. Should the loss of a forest be measured by the
value of the timber eliminated? What of the beauty destroyed?
What of the area's value as a wildlife habitat? In view of such
questions, it is unlikely that agency decision makers will be faced
with simple choices.
However, the difficulties involved in estimating the benefits or
costs of regulatory actions need not serve as a deterrent to pursuing the analysis. Merely identifying some of the important and
often overlooked impacts may be useful in the decision-making
process. Examples on the cost side include the beneficial drugs
that are not available because of regulatory obstacles, the freight
not carried because empty trucks are not permitted to carry backhauls, and the television stations that are not broadcasting because
they were not licensed. On the benefit side, examples include a
8

more productive work force that results from a lower rate of accidents on the job, savings in medical care because of safer products,
and a healthier environment that results from compliance with
governmental regulations.
At times the imperfections of benefit-cost analysis may seem substantial. Nevertheless, this analysis can add some objectivity to the
government's decision-making process. While benefit-cost analysis
is capable only of showing the effectiveness of an action, the subsequent decisions of elected officials and their appointees might
be envisioned as representing society's evaluations of the equity
effects of that action. Economists can provide benefit-cost analyses
and studies of 'the distribution of those benefits and costs, leaving
the final decision to society's representatives. Presumably, those
individuals are better able to make political decisions on the impacts of the actions they contemplate. Despite its shortcomings,
benefit-cost analysis is a neutral concept, giving equal weight to
a dollar of benefits and to a dollar of costs.
Not all the criticism of benefit-cost analysis may be valid. The
idea of attempting to quantify the effects of regulation outrages
some persons. They forget the objectives that economists have in
developing such measurements. The goal is not to eliminate all
regulation. As economists of all political persuasions have testified before a variety of congressional committees, it is not a question of being for or against government regulation of business. A
substantial degree of intervention in private activities is to be expected in a complex, modern society.
Critics who are offended by the notion of subjecting regulation
to a benefit-cost test may unwittingly be exposing the weakness
of their position: they must be convinced that some of their pet
rules would flunk the test. After all, showing that a regulatory activity generates an excess of benefits is a strong justification for
continuing it.
Despite talk of cold systems approaches, economists are deeply
concerned about people as well as dollar signs. The painful knowledge that resources available to safeguard human lives are limited
causes economists to become concerned when they see wasteful
use of those resources because of regulation.
General Motors, for example, calculates that society spends $700
million a year to reduce carbon monoxide auto emissions to 15
grams per mile, thus prolonging 30,000 lives an average of one
9

year, at a cost of $23,000 for each life. To meet the 1981 standard
of 3.4 grams per mile, the company estimates that it will cost
$100 million in addition, and prolong 20 lives by one year at an estimated cost of $25 million for each life. Hun1an lives are precious, which is why it is so sad to note another use of that n1oney.
It has been estimated that the installation of special cardiac-care
units in ambulances could prevent 24,000 premature deaths each
year, at an average cost of approximately $200 for each year of
life. 8 Thus spending the $100 million for the special ambulances
conceivably could save 500,000 lives a year.
Part of the problem in setting regulatory policy is that at times
the benefits are more visible than the costs-not necessarily greater,
but more evident. If the required scrubber for electric utilities results in cleaner air, we see the benefits. The costs are merely part
of the higher electric bill we pay. Thus, the cost of regulation takes
on the characteristics of a hidden sales tax that is paid by the
consumer.
A by-product of benefit-cost analyses is the identification of less
costly ways to achieve society's regulatory objectives. For example,
detailed estimates of industrial compliance with federal regulations, produced by Arthur Andersen & Company for the Business
Roundtable, revealed the types of regulations that tend to generate especially high costs. 9 Such information may help government policymakers select less costly approaches. (See Table 4. )
In the final analysis, however, the political factors in regulatory
decision making cannot be ignored. Many social regulations involve a transfer of economic resources from a large number of
people to a small group of beneficiaries. The Occupational Safety
and Health Act's (OSHA) coke-oven standard, for example, protects fewer than 30,000 workers, but is paid for by everyone who
buys a product containing steel. So long as regulators avoid concentrating the costs on a small group that could organize political
counterpressures, costly regulations can be promulgated easily. 10
Despite the limitations, there is a useful role for formal economic
analyses of regulatory impacts in providing, at least, an ancillary
guide to policymakers. As a federal court stated in striking down
OSHA's proposed benzene regulation: "Although the agency does
not have to conduct an elaborate cost-benefit analysis, ... it does
have to determine whether the benefits expected from the standards bear a reasonable relationship to the costs imposed by the

IO

Table 4
Attributes of Regulations with High Incremental Cost
Type of Regulation

Characteristics

Continuous Monitoring

Requires evidence of compliance by means
of round-the-clock monitoring devices or
continuous maintenance of comprehensive
records of actions taken and results
achieved.

Forcing New Technology

Requirement to meet a level of compliance
not achievable with available technology,
often effected through legislation specifying
a stringent deadline.

Capital Intensity

Requires the purchase of new equipment or
modification of existing equipment.

Recurring Costs

Requires actions that lead to continuing
costs of operation or maintenance.

Retrofitting

Requires modification of existing facilities,
not just application to new facilities.

Specified Compliance Action

Requires a specified method of compliance
without flexibility to recognize differing
circumstances for application of alternative
techniques to achieve the desired objective.

Inadequate Risk Assessment

Requires compliance with a stringent standard even though the risks have not been
adequately assessed.

Changing Requirements

Requires adaptation to rules that are frequently changed or are subject to delay in
being defined; capital-spending plans are
made without knowledge of requirements
to be met.

Source: Arthur Andersen & Company.

standard."11 That court's common-sense approach might be the
direction to which the public policy debates on regulation could
profitably shift.
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